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Overview 
Since the 1970's, much research has been done in an 
attempt to determine variables that cause decline of the 
president's popularity. Although there are different studies 
that give various reasons for the decline of the president's 
popularity, all agree that there is a trend of decline over 
the president's term. To represent the decline, James Stimson 
suggested a parabola model, whereas John Mueller suggested a 
linear-regression model. This paper attempts to show that a 
linear-regression model is more effective in explaining 
decline of the presidents from Truman to Johnson, than from 
Nixon to Bush. The findings show that a linear model does 
somewhat represent the era of Truman to Johnson better than 
the era of Nixon to Bush. 
Presidential Popularity and the Linear Model 
Political scientists continue to search for independent 
variables which affect presidential popularity. One common 
finding is a tendency for presidential popularity to decline 
over the term. This topic has been the subject of much 
research. There have been several hypotheses to explain the 
decline of presidents' popularity. Some of the hypotheses 
included war, party cleavages, and economics. George Edwards 
studied the variables of economy, war, issues, and rally 
events. John Mueller researched the possibility of a 
multivariate hypothesis; variables that he believed affected 
presidential popularity were time, national events, economy, 
and war. Samuel Kernell employed a marginal strategy which 
predicted popularity associated with partisanship. Richard 
Brody and Benjamin Page looked only at the Johnson 
administration and the Nixon administration and based the 
rise and fall of presidential popularity on "good" news and 
"bad" news. Henry Kenski and Kristen Monroe analyzed the 
effect of the economy on presidential popularity. These 
scholarly studies are discussed more in the literature 
review. 
There is a general consensus that there are variables 
which affect the ratings of the president, but questions 
regarding which variables and to what extent do the variables 
affect the decline of the president causes a considerable 
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disagreement. one of the disagreements is whether or not the 
ratings of the president can be represented by a linear 
regression or by a parabola model. A linear regression model 
suggests that the line will have a constant slope that will 
decline; whereas, a parabola line suggests that the slope 
will decline at different rates. John Mueller studied the 
decline of presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson and 
contended that the "coalition-of-minorities" is a strong 
variable affecting the decline of the president's popularity. 
He found linear declines in popularity for almost all the 
presidential terms he studied. In a more recent study, James 
Stimson, argued for a parabola model to explain the decline 
of the president's popularity. Stimson's model predicted 
that the president's popularity will be at its highest when 
he enters off ice. The decline will continue into the second 
half of the term then will rise slightly at the end of his 
term but will never reach again the previous high point. 
Stimson looked at popularity as being cyclical and a function 
of time. Stimson's and Mueller's research is discussed more 
extensively in the following background section. 
This thesis will review the literature pertaining to 
presidential popularity, propose a hypothesis, test the 
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hypothesis and analyze the results of the hypothesis. The 
contradiction between Stimson and Mueller is the focal issue. 
The thesis will test the linear model on two time periods. 
The predicted outcome is that the linear model is a better 
predictor of the era from the Truman administration through 
the Johnson administration than form the Nixon administration 
through the Bush administration. The reasoning behind the 
prediction relies on the known tendency that, over the past 
twenty years, the public's opinion has become more volatile. 
The change of the American people over the past two decades 
can be associated with their distrust of government, weak 
ties to parties, and the impact of media on public opinion. 
Background Information 
The background information gives a chronological 
overview of previous research. The start of the reviewed 
research begins in 1970 with John Mueller, and ends with a 
study by George Edwards in 1985. Over the past twenty years 
the studies have become advanced in manipulating data, with 
studies sometimes building on one another. Each study varies 
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in the approach used to test for presidential decline and on 
the proposed variables that attribute to this decline. 
John Mueller, from the University of Rochester, 
examined the president's popularity from Truman to Johnson 
(Mueller 1970) • Like most researchers of presidential 
popularity, he used the Gallup Poll's question "Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent) is handling 
his job as President?" Over time, the index has become the 
longest and the most consistently asked question in the 
history of polling. Mueller analyzed the polling results 
from the Truman administration to the end of the Johnson 
administration. During this time, the popularity question 
was asked 300 times. 
Mueller used four variables to predict the president's 
popularity. The variables were: 1) the length of time the 
incumbent has been in off ice, 2) the influence of ratings 
because of major national events, 3) the influence of ratings 
due to an economic slump, and 4) the impact of war on the 
president's ratings. He employed a multiple-regression 
analysis and a basic analytic technique to control for the 
independent impact of each variable. 
The dependent variable, presidential popularity, was the 
percentage approving the way the incumbent was handling his 
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job as president. The average approval rating for the 
presidents from Truman to Johnson was fifty-eight percent. 
The Gallup Poll's question on presidential popularity pried 
into the respondents' viewpoint on how the president was 
handling his job. The question did not relate the 
respondents opinion to a specific event or issue. It simply 
inquired whether or not the respondent approved or 
disapproved, and if no opinion was given, the opinion must be 
volunteered by the respondent to be included in the results. 
Mueller found that the president's popularity had varied 
from Truman to Johnson. Harry Truman was the most popular 
president. At one time, in 1945, his popularity reached 
eighty-five percent. Also, he was the least popular--from 
early 1951 until March 1952--with a ratings less than thirty 
percent. Lyndon Johnson closely approached Truman's highest 
approval rating. Eisenhower's rating topped off at seventy-
nine percent and did not drop below forty-nine percent. 
Also, Kennedy had a very high approval rating which did not 
drop much before his death. 
The "coalition of minorities" variable explained that 
even though a president always acts with majority support on 
an issue, he can alienate a sizable amount of minorities. In 
other words, a president will upset different minority groups 
(women, organized labor, environmentalist, etc. , ) , but a 
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combined coalition of minorities equals a majority of people 
that are displeased with the president for different reasons. 
There were three reasons a coalition of minorities could 
happen. First, the president gradually created unforgiving 
opponents out of his former supporters. Second, the 
president's actions could not please either side resulting in 
a "minus sum" game. Third, disillusionment occurs when the 
president makes promises he cannot keep. The occurrences of 
these coalition of minorities predicted decline. 
Mueller opertionalized the coalition-of-minorities 
variabler by using the length of time, in years, since the 
incumbent was inaugurated (for first terms) or re-elected 
(for second terms). Mueller calculated r as -.47 and the 
decline was to start over again for the second term because 
the president should have rebuilt his coalition of minorities 
into minority supporters. Mueller assumed a linear decline 
of popularity. In other words, he hypothesized that the 
president's decline would be at an even rate for his four 
years of his term. 
The "rally around the flag" variable expected that a 
president's popularity will increase due to certain intense 
international events. Mueller stated that caution must be 
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observed because one tended to find a sizable sudden increase 
in support and then dart to the historical records to find an 
intense international event. This process can prove that the 
variable is significant. 
Mueller adopted a different strategy to find rally 
points. "In general, a rally point must have associated with 
an event which 1) is international and 2) involves the United 
states and particularly the president directly; and it must 
be 3} specific, dramatic, and sharply focused." (Mueller 
1970) When using this criteria, Mueller found thirty-four 
rally points that fall into the following categories: sudden 
military intervention; major military developments in 
ongoing wars; major diplomatic developments; major 
technological developments; presidential conferences with a 
country's head; and the start of the president's term. 
Mueller operationalized the rally-around-the-flag 
variable by calculating the length of time, in years, since 
the last rally point. The simple r was -.11 and the variable 
is in linear form. This variable was used to test the 
hypothesis that although a president popularity declines over 
time, the spurt in the line can be explained by the rally-
around-the-flag variable. 
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The third variable examined by Mueller was the "economic 
slump." He used the unemployment rate as the economic 
indicator. Mueller recommended this indicator because of its 
availability by each month and because it had a general 
indicator of health. The economic variable was the 
unemployment rate at the time of inauguration subtracted from 
the rate at the time of the poll. During Eisenhower's term, 
unemployment reached some of its highest points. Mueller 
added a dummy variable to explain this phenomenon. The 
variable included the general taking care of the unemployed. 
Due to a correlation of .77 between the correlation 
coefficient and the regression coefficient for the economic 
variable, an adjustment was made. Mueller set the economic 
variable equal to zero, whenever the unemployment rate was 
lower at the time of the survey than it had been at the start 
of the incumbent's present term. It assumed "Bust is bad for 
him, but boom is not particularly good." (Mueller 1970) 
The fourth variable was war. During the study of 
presidential popularity, Truman's and Johnson's ratings were 
greatly effected by the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War. 
Mueller found that the correlation between presidential 
popularity and the war variable was -.66. However, Mueller 
recognized a problem in the analysis - the fact that Truman 
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and Johnson's popularity was declining before the wars 
started. Also, they both had a sizable decline in their 
first terms without the dilemma of war. To see how the wars 
effected the already declining popularity was to use another 
dummy variable, a variable that took on a value of one when 
a war was on and remained zero otherwise. 
To find the results, Mueller presented six equations. 
All the equations were presented in chart form, but not all 
of the equations were discussed. Each equation assessed the 
four variables and their association with the popularity of 
the president. Mueller discussed the war variable on its 
own. 
Equation one suggested that the 
rating started at sixty-nine percent 
average popularity 
and declined six 
percentage points per year. The coalition-of-minorities 
variable had a significant negative relationship. The 
coefficients of the rally around the flag variable and the 
economic slump variable moved in the right direction but 
failed to be statistically significant. 
Equation two added a dummy variable for all of the 
presidents. This equation suggested that all the presidents 
would decline or increase at the same rate and allowed for 
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each President to start at its own level of popularity. The 
rally-around-the-flag and the economic slump variables moved 
greater to the predicted direction. However, the rally-
around-the-f lag variable did not quite attain statistical 
significance. 
Equation three allowed for each president's popularity 
to start at different levels and increase at their own rate. 
President Truman's ratings fell eleven to twelve percentage 
points per year. Johnson's popularity ratings fell around 
nine percentage points per year. Kennedy ratings per year 
could not be assessed because of his untimely death. 
Equation three portrayed Eisenhower's approval ratings as not 
declining at all. On the contrary, Eisenhower achieved a 
statistically significant increase of popularity of two and 
a half percentage points per year. 
The rally around the flag variable proved to be 
statistically significant in equations 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
Mueller described that the rally around the flag variable 
acts as a parasite. This variable can explain the bumps and 
wiggles on the pattern for other variables. However, on its 
own the rally around the flag variable cannot explain all of 
the declines in presidential popularity. 
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The economic slump variable weakened in equation 3, 4, 
5, and 6 . This variable "suggests a decline of popularity of 
about three percentage points for every percentage point rise 
in the unemployment rate over the level holding when the 
President began his present term." (Mueller 1970) The 
economic slump variable tended to be limited because of the 
small (three to seven percentage points) of the unemployment 
rate. 
The war variable assessed the impact on Presidential 
popularity of the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Truman's and 
Johnson's popularity was in decline in their first terms and 
in clear decline in their second terms before the start of 
the wars; therefore, the dummy variable was used in equation 
6. Equation 6 implied that the presence of war would 
decrease the popularity ratings of Truman and Johnson by over 
seven per centage points. The results concluded that the 
Korean war had a statistically negative impact on Truman by 
eighteen percentage points. The Vietnam War, on the other 
hand, had no independent impact on Johnson's popularity 
ratings (Mueller 1970). 
Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page studied the impact 
of events on presidential popularity during the Johnson and 
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Nixon administrations (Wildavsky 1975). Their approach to 
explain presidential popularity was rather unique. The 
indicator of the rise in presidential popularity was "good 
news," and the fall was predicted by "bad news." More 
specifically, good news was considered to be news perceived 
as advancing their values. on the other spectrum, bad news 
was when a person perceived the news to impede their values. 
To determine good news and bad news, there were both 
clear-cut lines and not-so-clear lines. For good news, 
peace, prosperity, victory, and scientific discoveries were 
a given. For bad news it was assumed that unemployment, 
inflation, war casualties, and riots were bad. To determine 
the nature of news, Brody and Page used an empirical method 
to distinguish good news from bad news. 
Brody and Page gathered two time series to test their 
theory. The first time series started in June, 1965, and 
ended in April, 1968. The second time period covered 
January, 1969, through 1971. The percentage of the 
population at a given time which approved the president's 
handling of the job and the Gallup Poll were analyzed. Brody 
and Page found that these approval ratings occurred thirty-
f i ve times for Johnson and thirty-four times for Nixon. They 
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analyzed the data by tracking the changes in approval, and 
found that for Johnson the trend of popularity was down. 
From the beginning of his time series to the end, Johnson's 
popularity gradually went from seventy percent to thirty-six 
percent. Nixon's popularity was similar to a roller coaster. 
He started with a rating of sixty percent in 1969, and 
dropped to fifty percent in 1971, but climbed up to sixty 
percent once again before dropping to twenty-four percent in 
1972 . 
The independent variable was the balance of negative and 
positive news between two successive Gallup poll dates. News 
stories were the most important story in each day's news; 
they were classified into domestic, general foreign, and 
Vietnam. Then the news stories on the results of policy 
performance were coded as "good," "bad," or "ambiguous." The 
results seemed to be statistically significant. The theory 
was confirmed in both administrations. The single variable 
of news discrepancy correlated .so with opinion change in the 
Johnson administration and .28 in Nixon's administration. 
The theory accounted for eighty-four percent of the variation 
in the level of the presidential popularity for Johnson and 
fifty-five percent for Nixon. Brody and Page stated that 
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"the presidential popularity can be accounted for by the 
inertial effect of past opinions and the quality of news 
between polls." (Wildavsky 1975) 
James A. Stimson reported in his article, "Public 
support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model," the 
ability to predict presidential popularity with a parabola 
model (Stimson 1976) . Using the data derived from the 
popular Gallup question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the 
way (the incumbent President] is handling his job as 
President," Stimson explained that the consistency of the 
question and the small random error of each data point were 
the reasons for using the Gallup Poll. Stimson used the 
measure of "relative approval" (the percent approving as a 
proportion of all those expressing an opinion). Stimson 
preferred the reactive approval over the simple approval 
because of the abundance of "no opinion" given in earlier 
surveys. 
Stimson utilized a parabola, concave upward, with a 
focus in the latter half of the presidential term to model 
the popularity of the president. The model theorized that 
the president's popularity would peak when he first took 
off ice and then would gradually decline over time and bottom 
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out during the last half of the four year term. After the 
period of bottoming out, the approval rating would slightly 
increase, but not to its original level. 
To fit data on the parabola model, some criteria must be 
met. One criterion was the ability to predict the individual 
data points. The second criteria must be that not only 
should the data points be predicted, but that the prediction 
should be significantly better than predictions using a 
linear model. Stimpson arranged the computed approval scores 
for the seven terms (Truman to Nixon) • All points were 
gathered along the same zero to four-year time scale. Time 
was ordered as presidential years. Stimson uniquely 
determined the coefficients, and the parabola predicted all 
the Gallup approval readings for five Presidents and seven 
terms. The correlation was one-half percent. With this high 
correlation, Stimson met the above criteria. Stimson 
concluded that the parabola model was an effective 
representation of Presidential popularity (Stimson 1976). 
Henry c. Kenski tested the impact of economic conditions 
on presidential popularity. The study analyzed the 
presidential popularity from Eisenhower to Nixon's second 
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term. Truman was dropped due to underepresentation of data 
points and defects in sampling. 
Kenski's report noted that Mueller used unemployment as 
an indicator of the state of the economy. Also, he noted 
Hibbs contended that Mueller's indicator of the economy was 
not statistically significant. Mueller had suggested using 
other variables in addition to unemployment; so and Kenski 
applied Mueller's advice, using unemployment and two 
indicators of inflation (general price and food price). 
Also, Kenski changed the measurement of the economic 
variables which were monthly data and used six-month moving 
averages. 
Kenski assessed the economic indicators to presidential 
popularity by using an analytic technique of multiple 
regression. The regression coefficients, the standard 
errors , and the r-scores were also examined. The last 
technique employed was the t-test to determine the confidence 
limits for the regression coefficients at the ninety-five 
percent confidence level. 
Inflation appeared to be more sensitive than 
unemployment. The impact of the monthly rate and six-month 
moving average of unemployment proved not to be statistically 
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significant. The signs of the coefficients were positive. 
However, when the presidents' administrations were separated, 
the popularity of the Republican presidents could be 
adversely affected by the rate of unemployment. On the other 
hand, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were positive. 
Kenski argued that it would be foolish to impute a causal 
linkage, but instead concluded that the Democratic presidents 
were able to record their highest popularity ratings despite 
high unemployment. The results of the impact of inflation on 
presidential popularity had an association, but Kenski felt 
that the statistically significant findings were tainted by 
serial correlation. Kenski suggested that the serial 
correlation problem should rank high on the agenda to be 
solved. Another concern was his use of the bivariate theory. 
Kenski proposed the development of a multivariate theory 
regarding the impact of the economic conditions on 
presidential popularity (Kenski 1977). 
Samuel Kernell took the marginal strategy approach to 
assess public opinion (Kernell 1978). In the marginal 
strategy approach there were two predictions of presidential 
popularity and economic performance. The first prediction 
stated that Democrats' support of the president will be 
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associated closely with unemployment, and Republicans' 
support with inflation. The second prediction stated that 
the president can gain new support among opposition 
identifiers. Kernell tested these predictions from 
Eisenhower to Reagan's first term. To assure that the 
results were not biased, Kernell identified exogenous 
variables in addition to the economy's effects on 
presidential popularity. 
Inflation failed to produce a negative sign during the 
Kennedy and Reagan administration; therefore, this part of 
the analysis was omitted. Unemployment for the Democrats 
under Carter showed a positive sign, an inverse relationship 
between the economic indicator and the president's approval 
rating. 
Overall, Kernell found that there were differences in 
the relative strengths of the relationship across partisan 
groups; however, Johnson's and Nixon's partisan relationship 
were consistent with the prediction made by the Gallup Poll 
Surveys. The Gallop Poll Survey predicted that, whatever a 
person's political affiliation, they will judge the economy 
on the basis of its general conditions. 
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Kernell did find some support for the marginal strategy 
approach to assess presidential popularity. For Eisenhower's 
popularity, neither unemployment nor inflation had much 
impact, but the relationships were stronger for opposition 
identifiers than presidential partisans (Kernell 1986). 
Kristen R. Monroe tested the economic influences on 
presidential popularity (Monroe 1978). In 1976, James Stimson 
said that, in the long term, the president's popularity was 
unaffected by economic conditions. Monroe took the same time 
frame as Stimson {1950-1974) and, with more sophisticated 
equipment, found a strong relationship between the ratings of 
presidents and the economic conditions. She theorized that 
the influence from the economy needed a lag model in which 
economic influence may be both immediate and cumulative. The 
lag model would allow for a time lag before people experience 
the impact of economic events and an extended time period 
during which people react to economic changes. 
In Monroe's data, presidential popularity was measured 
by the percentage of respondents who indicated approval of 
the president in the monthly Gallup Poll from 1950, through 
the end of the Nixon incumbency in 1974. To represent the 
economy, Monroe used unemployment {U), inflation (I), real 
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personal income (RBI), the Standard and Poor Market index 
(SM), and military expenditures (MILX). The first three 
representatives of the economy were to measure the political 
influences from individual economic well-being. The MILX 
variable was to indicate the government's fiscal policies to 
stimulate the economy. 
Monroe employed a distributed lag model that was used by 
Almon in 1965. This model permitted the effects of the 
economy to be distributed over different periods. The Almon 
model allowed for situations in which the political impact of 
economic condition may be noted slowly and felt a long time 
after it occurred. For example, an increased inflation in 
the spring could still have an impact into the fall. When 
using the Almon equation, dummy variables were used to 
control the cyclical fluctuations. Also, manipulations were 
effective in eliminating the trends of the variables in the 
use of the time series. 
Monroe concluded that inf lat ion and military 
expenditures were consistently significant influences on 
presidential popularity. However, unemployment, real 
personal income, and the stock market were not significant 
influences on popularity. The cumulative sum of the statis-
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tical significance suggested that, if inflation increased one 
percent, the effect was a decrease of almost four percentage 
points in popularity; therefore, the overall pattern of the 
data showed that inflation was a significant negative influ-
ence on presidential popularity and can have an impact which 
stays politically important and significant up to one year 
after the occurrence. The military expenditures, too, were 
significant and politically important, but the positive 
effect was present from thirteen to twenty-three months after 
the expenditure, but not any time before (Monroe 1978). 
George Edwards conducted a study to test for the effects 
of economy, war, issue differences with the president, and 
rally events on the president's approval (Edwards 1985). The 
statistics used were tau-b and Somer's o. Edwards noted that 
lack of uniformity appears to be a problem with data 
consistency across studies. The surveys he analyzed did not 
specifically ask the same question from time to time. Also, 
the types of questions varied in degree. Edwards noted that 
the economy definitely has an influence on Americans. Some 
political scientists believe the economy is the basis for 
approval or disapproval of the president. However, recently 
some scholars argued that the public evaluates the success of 
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the president on grounds other than economics. "In other 
words, rather than asking what the president has done for 
them lately, citizens ask what the president has done for the 
nation (Edwards 1985)." 
In the surveys regarding a person,s economic perspec-
tive, the two questions asked were "Would you say that you 
(and your family living here) are better off or worse off 
financially than you were a year ago?" and "Do you think that 
a year from now you (and your family living here) will be 
better off financially or worse off, or just about the same 
as now?" The questions were cross-tabulated with presiden-
tial approval ratings. From 1968 to 1980, this relationship 
between popularity ratings and financial status accounted for 
fifty-two percent of those polled. The approval or 
disapproval ratings of the president is directly related to 
whether or not the financial status of those polled had gone 
up or done. 
Unemployment statistics cross-tabulated with presiden-
tial approval resulted in a weak correlation. The unemploy-
ment of a respondent or of the head of family would seem to 
cause respondents to evaluate the president's performance 
negatively. Edwards believed that people who were unemployed 
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would be more likely to blame the president if they felt 
unemployment was a solvable problem. The result showed a 
statistically weak correlation of -.11 only among the 
Democrats and no correlation for any other respondents. 
Also, when the control was that the federal government was 
responsible for providing everyone with a good job and 
standard of living, there was no statistically significant 
relationship. Edwards overall findings concluded that 
personal experience with unemployment does not strongly 
correlate with the popularity of the president. 
Since inflation affects everyone in the country, 
Edwards assumed inflation would have a widespread effect on 
the president's popularity. If people were to evaluate the 
president on economic condition, then inflation should 
reflect the president's approval. Edwards' analysis of the 
personal impact of inflation on respondents was based on 1980 
data. The data proved not to be statistically significant at 
-.08 for the Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. 
Then Edwards proceeded to ask respondents their view of 
the presidents performance on economic policy. The 
significance ranged form -.29 to -.so. Edwards found that 
this evaluation was not more statistically significant than 
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the evaluation of inflation. He attributed this to the logic 
that "the public evaluates the president more on the basis of 
how it thinks the economy itself is performing." (Edwards 
1985) Edwards concluded that economic factors do affect the 
presidency but not to a great extent. However, he found a 
substantial difference in the relationship between the 
public's evaluation of the president on economic policy and 
the public's personal economic condition. 
When Edwards analyzed war and the president's approval, 
he only evaluated the effect of the Vietnam War. The 1968 
survey asked respondents if a close friend or family member 
served in Vietnam. Edwards assumed that, if a person 
evaluated the president on the impact of the war, it would be 
revealed here. He admitted that his assumption was wrong, for 
in no incident did this happen. 
In the three surveys (1968, 1970, 1972), respondents 
were asked to rate on a scale what they felt was the right 
policy for Vietnam. The scale ranged from withdraw to 
completing a military victory. Then the respondents were 
asked to place the president on the same scale. To determine 
the president's approval on the war issue, Edwards computed 
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the differences with the president on Vietnam. The statis-
tics proved to be significant at -.01. 
In summary, the findings were similar to those for the 
economy. The respondents evaluated the president in terms of 
their perception of the president's performance. Personal 
experience with the war in Vietnam proved to be almost 
irrelevant. 
Edwards conducted seven surveys to measure the impact of 
issues and policy on the president's popularity. Respon-
dents were asked to place both themselves and the president 
on a scale for each of a variety of issues. Then Edwards 
computed the results by adding the absolute differences 
between the respondents and the president on each issue. 
Almost all of the data proved to be statistically significant 
and varied in terms of strength. 
A rally event, as defined by John Mueller, was interna-
tional, directly involves the U.S. and particularly the 
president. A rally event is specific, dramatic, and sharply 
focused. This included events that were prominent to the 
public. The rally event theory assumes that the people will 
increase their support for the president in times of crisis 
because "America is at stake." 
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In the Edward's study, all rally events were considered 
equal. An increase of ten percentage points in the polls was 
the baseline for an impact by a rally event. Two approaches 
were taken in identifying a rally event. The first approach 
looked at sudden jumps in presidential approval to see if 
they followed a rally event. The second approach examined 
all qualifying rally events to see if they preceded a surge 
in presidential approval. 
Sudden jumps occurred in the polls twenty-one times. 
Not even half of the surges were preceded by a rally event. 
Edwards said it was difficult to determine the effect. The 
rally event proved to be hard to isolate. In conclusion, 
there seemed to be no difference between the rally event 
surges and the non rally event surges. 
Edwards concluded that presidential approval ratings 
were due to how the public evaluated the handling of poli-
cies. Policy efforts and issue stands play a more important 
role than unemployment , the cost of living and war casual-
ties. Therefore, the public expected the presidents to handle 
issues successfully (Edwards 1983). 
Methods and Procedure 
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Using the Gallup Poll seemed to be the best choice for 
popularity ratings. The Gallup Poll's constant regularity 
over the past four decades, using the question "Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent) is handling 
his job as President?", has provided a basis for a presiden-
tial popularity index. Over time, this index is one of the 
longest, continuous line of questioning in polling history. 
This study divides the line for the period of the beginning 
of the Truman administration to the end of the Johnson 
administration as time period "A," and the beginning of the 
Nixon administration to the end of the Bush administration as 
time period "B." The time periods are tested to see whether 
or not that time period "A" can be predicted by a linear 
decline model better than time period "B." 
The data was incorporated into a data file. The data 
file included the date of the popularity rating, the approval 
rating, and a dummy variable. Most of the polling was taken 
once per month; however, in the instance that there were more 
than one per month, the first polling of each month was 
included and the last polling of the month was discarded. 
The dummy variable was set as a constant. The following is 
the point slope formula used: 
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predicted population = intercept BO + Bl(dummy variable) 
To attain Bl and BO of the point slope formula the approval 
rating was regressed against the dummy variable for each term 
not including the last year of each term. The remaining 
dummy variables were then added into the formula for the last 
year of the president's term. In the case of a president 
serving more than one term the data started over as if 
ignoring the previous term. This approach tried to predict 
popularity ratings for the last last year of each term. Each 
predicted approval data point was then compared to the actual 
rating done by the Gallup Poll by taking the difference 
between the projected popularity and the real popularity. 
When taking the difference, each difference was turned into 
a positive. For example, if a predicted popularity was 
thirty-five percent and the real popularity was twenty-five 
percent the difference would be negative ten. The number was 
then given a positive sign because the predicted popularity 
varies; therefore, the average of the difference would appear 
much smaller. Then an average was taken for each term to 
compare the accuracy of the linear model {See Appendix K). 
Last, a regression line was used because which "best 
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summarizes the distribution of data points on a scatter 
diagram and the slope of which characterizes the relationship 
in units of change between two intervals." (Manheim and Rich 
1991) 
Results 
All president's approval ratings have unique and similar 
qualities. I will evaluate president's approval ratings in 
two ways. First, I will evaluate each president for the 
variance of their approval ratings, their approval ratings in 
relation to winning or losing reelection, the ability to 
predict their approval rating and the accuracy of the linear 
model compared to the curvilinear model. Second, I will 
evaluate their ratings by comparing time period A to time 
period B. Areas to analyze will include the accuracy of the 
linear model and the patterns of the president's approval 
rating. 
Due to infrequent polls and erratic polling intervals 
that were not set, Truman has been discarded from the 
analysis. After predicting for Truman's last year which 
consisted of five points, the average error in predicting was 
close to twenty percent. The polls simply were not taken 
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frequently enough. There were a total of twenty-one polls 
taken over a four year time period. The linear regression 
model must have consistency in polling for projection 
purposes. 
Eisenhower's first term 
During Eisenhower's first term, the Gallup Poll surveyed 
the public twenty-seven times (See Appendix A). Only four 
polls were taken the last year of his first term; therefore, 
four approval ratings were predicted for him. The variance 
of Eisenhower's approval ratings for his first three years 
ranged from fifty-seven percent to seventy-nine percent. The 
fact his approval rating was always more than fifty percent 
during his first term helps explain his re-election to a 
second term. 
When predicting Eisenhower's approval ratings, the 
difference between the projected popularity and the real 
popularity ranged from a high of six and a half points and a 
low of one. The average difference between the projected and 
the actual popularity was close to three points. Compared to 
the other presidents, Eisenhower's predicted popularity fared 
rather well. The success of the predicted approval rating 
could have been due to the fact that each of his last four 
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approval rating points from one polling to another did 
actually regress. 
Eisenhower's second term 
Eisenhower's second term did not predict as well as his 
first term (See Appendix B). Twenty-seven polls were taken 
over the four years of his second term. Again Eisenhower 
kept his approval ratings above fifty percent; the highest 
rating was seventy-nine percent, and the lowest was fifty-two 
percent. During his fourth year, seven polls were taken, and 
the difference between the actual and the predicted 
popularity ranged from a high twelve and a half and a low of 
one. There were three points when his ratings did not follow 
a decline in his polls. One of these points was at the end 
of his term when a new president was already elected and the 
public was being kinder to Eisenhower. The average 
difference between projected and actual popularity was six, 




Although Kennedy's term was unfortunately cut short, 
there were enough data to include him in the analysis (See 
Appendix C). There were twenty-one polls taken in a three 
year period and the last eight pollings were predicted. 
During the first two years of his term, the highest approval 
rating stood at seventy-nine percent, and the lowest dropped 
to sixty-six percent. The last approval rating taken during 
his third year reached a low of fifty-nine percent. 
The difference between the estimated and the real 
popularity ranged from a high of nine and a low of four; 
whereas, the average was six compared to an average of twelve 
during his first year. The range of his actual approval 
ratings was between sixty-six percent to fifty-nine percent. 
All but two of Kennedy's approval ratings declined. The 
predicted approval rates tended to overestimate Kennedy's 
approval ratings. 
Johnson 
The analysis of Johnson begins at his election in 1964. 
During his time in office, the thirty-three polls taken 
showed a wide range of approval (See Appendix D). He peaked 
at seventy percent and hit bottom at thirty five percent. In 
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September of 1966, his approval rating dropped below fifty 
percent and never recovered. 
Johnson's last year had more of a curvilinear look than 
a linear. The ability to predict his approval ratings had an 
average difference of eight. The difference between the 
expected and the actual popularity ranged from a low of less 
than one to a high of eighteen. If the last approval point 
of Johnson was thrown out, assuming the jump in his last 
approval rating was given out of generosity of ending his 
term, then the average difference would improve to seven 
points. The predicted approval rates tended to underestimate 
the approval ratings. 
Nixon's first term 
During Eisenhower's term twenty-seven polls were taken; 
whereas, in Nixon's first term there were forty-four 
pollings. Nixon's popularity fluctuated from forty-eight 
percent to sixty-eight percent (See Appendix E). The 
predicted approval ratings tended to underestimate Nixon's 
actual approval ratings. The difference of the expected and 
the real popularity ratings ranged from a low of one to a 
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high of fourteen and a half points; whereas, the average 
difference was close to ten points. 
The approval ratings for Nixon would probably be better 
predicted using a curvilinear model. Nixon's lowest approval 
ratings occurred toward the second half of his third year and 
than moved from forty-eight percent to sixty-two percent 
within a year and a half. One reason for the increase of 
approval ratings in his fourth year could have been his 
successful campaign to rebuild public support for his 
upcoming election. 
Nixon's second term 
Nixon's second term consisted of eighteen polls over a 
two year period, and there was an attempt to predict the last 
six points (See Appendix F). The ratings started rather low 
at fifty-one percent and ended even lower at twenty-six 
percent. The highest approval rating was sixty-five percent 
which occurred in the middle of fifty-one percent approval 
and fifty-nine percent approval. For the most part the 
ratings were extremely low, dwindling to twenty-two percent. 
The rapid decline of his approval rating was caused by 
the Watergate scandal. The fluctuation of the approval 
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rating varied forty-three percent over two years, which 
probably substantiates the fact that the predicted approval 
rating was highly underestimating Nixon's approval rating. 
Nixon's second term regressed, but the rate of regression was 
too quick for the linear model to be accurate. The last 
predicted approval rating for Nixon predicted an approval 
rating of forty-six points, which was a difference of twenty 
points from the actual approval rating. The first approval 
rating had a difference of five points. The average approval 
rating between the real and the estimated approval rating was 
twelve. 
Ford 
Ford's variance of approval ratings for all twenty-four 
polls taken ranged from thirty-seven percent to seventy-one 
percent (See Appendix G). The average difference of the 
actual approval and the estimated approval rating was nine. 
The predicted approval ratings underestimated the actual 
approval ratings. Ford's popularity steadily declined the 
last year of his term; however, the last rating taken in 
36 
December 1976, was rather high. If it were to be eliminated, 
the average would improve to eight points. This would 
represent a more accurate picture of Ford's linear decline of 
his approval rating. These low approval ratings, which were 
almost all below fifty-percent, could reflect the incident of 
not being re-elected. 
carter 
Forty-six polls assessed the approval ratings for 
Carter. The approval ratings fluctuated from twenty-nine 
percent to seventy percent (See Appendix H). For the most 
part, the last year represented a linear decline, but the 
starting point for the predicted approval rating was so low 
that the difference between the real approval rating and the 
projected approval rating was nearly twenty-six points. 
Overall, the predicted approval ratings were underestimating 
the Gallup Poll approval ratings. The difference between the 
predicted approval rating and the real approval rating ranged 
from eight to twenty-six, and the average was fifteen. Like 
Ford, Carter's struggled during his last year in office to 
maintain approval ratings above fifty-percent. Also like 
Ford, Carter lost this bid for re-election for a second term. 
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Reaqan's first term 
During Reagan's first term, the Gallup Poll administered 
the presidential approval poll forty-seven times, and eleven 
of the last approval ratings were attempted predictions (See 
Appendix I). Reagan's approval ratings varied from thirty-
one percent to sixty-eight percent. The predicted approval 
ratings tended to underestimate Reagan's last year. In fact 
the relation of the predicted approval rating to the actual 
approval ratings were inversely proportioned. The lowest 
difference between the real and predicted popularity was the 
first prediction which differed by twelve, and the point 
difference between the prediction and the real approval 
ratings increased for each consecutive prediction. 
Therefore, the last predicted approval rating was the 
highest; it differed by twenty-six. The average difference 
between predicted approval ratings and the approval ratings 
was eighteen. Reagan's approval ratings progressed during 
the last year of his first term, which could have been caused 
by his attempt to regain support for his re-election. 
Reaqan's second term 
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Reagan's second term was more successful in terms of 
higher approval ratings. Only nine approval ratings out of 
thirty-nine pollings were below fifty-percent. The average 
difference between the predicted and the estimated popularity 
was two and a half points (See Appendix J). This success 
seems the predicted approval ratings would assume that 
Reagan's last year followed linear regression. However, the 
raw approval ratings if plotted on a graph would not 
exemplify a linear regression nor curvilinear regression. 
The graph of points would look more like a yo-yo which goes 
up and down for no apparent reason. The approval ratings 
never varied more than five points, so even the greatest 
difference did not exceed five points. 
Bush 
During Bush's administration, the Gallup Poll surveyed 
his popularity forty-seven times. During the first three 
years of his administration, Bush kept his approval ratings 
above fifty percent and peaked at an overwhelming eighty-nine 
percent. Despite the fact that he was given the highest 
approval rating of all the Presidents from Truman to Reagan, 
he failed to get re-elected. 
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Bush's approval rating his last year regressed straight 
downward, but the whole term did not (See Appendix K). The 
last year of approval ratings saw the fall of his ratings 
after the peak of the curve. The predicted approval ratings 
highly overestimated Bush's actual approval ratings. The 
predicted approval ratings for Bush's last year in office 
ironically progressed as the Gallup Poll's approval ratings 
regressed. Bush was the only president in this study to 
possess a progressive predicted approval rating; therefore, 
his average difference between real and predicted popularity 
was thirty-three which was higher than any other President. 
The progression of the predicted approval rating happened 
because the first three years of Bush's term progressed 
rather than regressed. Also, the trend during Bush's term to 
receive continually higher approval ratings halted near the 
end of his third year . So the predicted approval ratings 
predicted progressive ratings, whereas Bush's actual ratings 
exemplified the linear model. 
Time period A and B 
Time periods A and B contained some interesting 
elements. To analyze the results of the study, a comparison 
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must be made between time period A and B. The data for each 
time period possess some patterns, and the predicted approval 
ratings vary for each time period. Another important element 
was whether or not each time period followed the linear 
model. 
The first comparison made was the approval ratings. In 
time period A, the approval ratings stayed above fifty 
percent except for Johnson, whereas in time period B, not one 
president's approval ratings stayed above fifty percent. For 
time period A, the difference between the highest and lowest 
approval ratings hovered in the twenties, and for time period 
B, the difference was in the thirties and forties. The 
approval ratings in time period A remained between fifty and 
seventy percent most of the time. However, in time period B, 
ratings dropped to the twentieth percentile and reached as 
high as the upper eighties. The highest and lowest approval 
ratings for presidents since the 1950's can be seen in time 
period B. This truly supports one premise of the thesis that 
public opinion was more volatile in the post-Nixon era. 
The second comparison was the success of the predicted 
approval ratings {See Appendix K). For time period A, the 
total average difference between real and estimated 
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popularity of each president was six points, and for time 
period B, the average was eleven and a half points. Time 
period A could be better predicted by using the linear model, 
but there was no continuity in predicting the points. 
The least average difference between the actual and the 
predicted popularity rating, Reagan's second term, was in 
time period B, the time period which had a greater average 
difference between the actual and the estimated popularity. 
The second lowest average difference was for Eisenhower's 
first term (See Appendix L). For Eisenhower's second term, 
Johnson, Nixon's both terms, Carter, and Reagan's first term, 
the predicted approval ratings tended to underestimate the 
actual approval ratings. The only times the predicted 
popularity ratings overestimated were for Bush and Kennedy. 
When the predicted approval ratings overestimated or 
underestimated, the difference was clearly seen. However for 
Eisenhower's first term and Reagan's second term the 
popularity rating jumped over and under the predicted 
popularity rating. 
All of the president's predicted popularity declined 
except for Bush. Bush was a-typical because his popularity 
ratings were so high, the predicted population had a positive 
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point slope. The presidents last year did decline, the 
regression did not reflect the success of the predicted 
approval ratings. If the starting point for the first 
predicted approval rating was equal to the first actual 
approval rating and continue to use the rate of decline, then 
the predicted approval ratings would be more favorable. 
conclusion 
As predicted in the hypothesis, time period A can be 
predicted better than time period B when using a linear 
model. The problem lies in whether or not it is 
statistically significant. To be statistically significant, 
time period A and time period B must possess a distinct 
difference in the success or failure of the linear model 
predictions. 
Three reasons can be given for not relying heavily on 
this hypothesis. One is that, although there are differences 
in the variance of the approval ratings, the approval ratings 
for Presidents within a particular time period were not 
always similar to each other. Second, the linear model 
worked better for time period A, but that could be due to the 
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lack of polling during the last six months of off ice when 
most candidates regain more support. The differences could 
be due to the fact that the periods of polling were 
different. To improve this, rather than predict the last 
year, the prediction should be only for the first six months 
of the President's last year. Thirdly, the predicted 
approval ratings and the real ratings average difference only 
varied six between time period A and B, but what value should 
be considered a poor or good prediction was not determined. 
The hypothesis heads in the right direction; the idea should 
not be totally discarded because of the problems mentioned 
above, but more research and analysis should be done on the 
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